The progresses and successes of molecular biology appear to confirm the views of those who hold that biology is reducible to the sciences of physical nature. François Duchesneau’s analysis of various models and attempts at reduction that have been put forth to eliminate the specificity of the phenomena of organic life, shows that things are far from being so simple. Teleological notions seem irreducible to subjacent causal mechanisms, and functional explanations are apparently indispensable in the life sciences. But the discussions (...) analyzed by Duchesneau show that allowing for the irreducibility and the necessity of functional analyses in the life sciences does riot amount thereby to any vitalism. The aim is simply to analyze the structure and epistemological profile of biological theories, instead of providing a rational reconstruction thereof, in conformity with the positivistic prejudice that biological explanations had to be deduced front the laws of physical nature. Of course, this implies paying attention to the manner in which biologists did indeed construct their concepts and their theories. Now, in analyzing recent developments in English-language philosophy of biology, Duchesneau shows how the increasing dialogue between philosophy and the history of science in this tradition is useful. I believe that these English-language discussion are in fact coming closer to the French tradition represented by authors such as Georges Canguilhem or Jacques Roger, even though in France, as Duchesneau observes, the two disciplines appear to be moving further apart. This would be a shame, given that this tradition appears to be quite fruitful in its epistemological perspectives. (shrink)

L’ouvrage collectif dirigé par Diane-Gabrielle Tremblay propose d’analyser la diversité des temporalités sociales et la manière dont elles sont vécues par les individus en fonction du pays, de l’âge, du contexte personnel et professionnel. Il rassemble 13 contributions réparties en 3 parties. La première traite de la conciliation emploi famille de manière globale, la seconde poursuit la réflexion sur les temps prescrits et temps réels en abordant quelques pratiques..

ABSTRACTBecause of their reliance on mechanistic metaphors and analogies referring to machines, the eighteenth-century materialists La Mettrie and Diderot have sometimes been described as ‘mechanistic materialists’. However, if one pays close attention to the ways in which mechanical analogies and metaphors were used in eighteenth-century French materialism, one sees that the recourse to these metaphors and comparisons in no way implies mechanism in the sense of physicalist reductionism. Instead, early instances of these comparisons appear in arguments pointing out that technological (...) artefacts have functional properties which are not reducible to their physical properties. When La Mettrie compares man to a machine in his L'homme machine, he insists at the same time on the fact that, just like a machine, man is a cultural artefact. According to La Mettrie, man's very existence depends on language and culture, and it is precisely this dependence on culture which distinguishes him from other animals. However... (shrink)

L'exégèse paulinienne du XX° siècle ayant principalement été le fait des spécialistes de confession protestante, l'article suit les changements opérés et s'attarde sur deux figures qui ont notablement animé et marqué les recherches actuelles, E.P. Sanders et H. Räisänen. Avec sa théorie du nomisme d'alliance, Sanders a sans doute le plus œuvré pour montrer le primat de la christologie dans la sotériologie paulinienne. Si son idée de nomisme d'alliance était vraie, Paul n'aurait jamais pensé que le judaïsme était une religion (...) légaliste. L'apôtre doit bien plutôt y avoir vu un nomisme d'alliance. L'idée de légalisme doit être d'origine plus tardive, et vient de la théologie biblique protestante. Pour Sanders, Paul est un adepte du nomisme d'alliance, qui construit sa sotériologie christologique sur une base juive, et n'a pas voulu critiquer la conduite de la foi juive, le nomisme ; il ne nie pas les croyances juives, mais sa christologie dicte sa sotériologie. Sans nier que Christ soit le centre de la sotériologie de l'apôtre, l'article essaie de voir si Sanders a bien mis en évidence la structure de base de la pensée de Paul et sa relation aux enseignements des écrits du judaïsme du second Temple. La discussion de la théorie de Sanders et de certains de ceux qui ont suivi ses idées, montre que l'idée qu'ils se font du judaïsme du second Temple est trop étroite, et cela a eu pour conséquence de leur faire mal interpréter la relation de Paul au judaïsme de son temps.Pauline exegesis of the past century was generally the work of prostestant specialists. This article considers the changes brought about, concentrating on two individuals who had animated and influenced present day research, E.P. Sanders and H. Raïsänen. Without doubt, Sanders with his theory of covenant nomism, had worked the most to show the primacy of Christology in Pauline soteriology. If his idea of covenant nomism were true, Paul would never have thought that Judaism was a legalistic religion. Rather, the apostle must have seen a covenant nomism in it. The idea of legalism must have had a later origin, and comes from protestant biblical theology. For Sanders, Paul is an adept of covenant nomism, which constructed his Christological soteriology on a Jewish basis, and he did not want to criticize the conduct of the Jewish faith, nomism. He did not deny Jewish beliefs, but his Christology dictated his soteriology. Without denying that Christ was the center of the apostole's soteriology, ther article tries to see if Sanders clarified the basic structure of Paul's thought and its relation to the teachings of the writings of Judaism of second Temple. The discussion of Sander's theory, and of those who followed his ideas, shows that the idea they have of second Temple Judaism is too narrow, and this had the consequence of leading them to a bad interpretation of the relation of Paul to the Judaism of his time. (shrink)

La Siris est une série d’arguments qui aboutit à Dieu. D’abord, Dieu est un principe métaphysique qui, par causalité, régit le monde, ou macrocosme. Mais les paragraphes terminaux de la Siris traitent de Dieu dans une perspective théologique : Berkeley introduit la notion de Trinité et la relie à ses raisonnements antérieurs. Il dit que le Père, le Fils et l’Esprit correspondent aux notions philosophiques de soleil, de lumière et de chaleur. J’étudie ces paragraphes théologiques et leur articulation avec ce (...) qui, dans les développements antérieurs, concerne plus particulièrement la théorie corpusculaire de la lumière.Berkeley’s Siris is a chain of arguments which ends in God. First God is a metaphysical principle causally regulating the world or Macrocosm. But in the final paragraphs of Siris, God is treated in a theological perspective. This is to say that Berkeley introduces the idea of the Trinity and relates it to the rest of his chain argument. He says that Father, Son, and Spirit correspond to the philosophical notions of sun, light, and heat. I study the final theological paragraphs of Siris and try to relate them to the preceding arguments of this book, especially the corpuscular theory of light. (shrink)

La nueva ley de bioética en Francia, propuesta en 2019 y aprobada por la Asamblea Nacional el 29 de junio de 2021, introduce en su artículo primero, relativo a las Tecnologías de Reproducción Artificial (ART por sus siglas en inglés), modificaciones al artículo L. 2141-2 y L. 2141-3 de la ley número 2011-814 de 7 de julio de 2011 relativa a la bioética. Abre así el camino a “cualquier pareja formada por un hombre o una mujer o por dos mujeres (...) o cualquier mujer soltera”. Como resultado, se rompe el vínculo entre el derecho y la bioética. Mientras que el derecho debe proteger el interés individual, la bioética le recuerda al derecho que también debe protegerse el bien común. De ahí las siguientes interrogantes que surgen a raíz de esta nueva ley de bioética: ¿las ART son un derecho para todos? ¿Es legítimo reivindicarlo en nombre de la igualdad? ¿Qué pasa con la justicia? En este artículo me gustaría abordar el tema desde un punto de vista biojurídico, situando el problema en el marco de la filosofía del derecho. (shrink)

Editor's Note: Over a long period of time, the evil bourgeois reactionary line has created antagonism between two groups of students in schools—antagonism on the basis of one's family background. This antagonism became very obvious during the initial stage of the Cultural Revolution, and has lasted to this day. It has prevented further criticism of the bourgeois reactionary line and hindered further development of the Cultural Revolution.

In December of last year, a few clowns appeared on the grand and spectacular stage of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. These clowns were the reincarnated ghosts from the Capital Red Guard West City, East City, and Haidian Districts Pickets. They viciously attacked Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, engaged in slander on the Central Cultural Revolution Group, called dear Comrade Jiang Qing names, and sabotaged the organizations under the proletarian dictatorship. They provoked violence, created chaos, searched and confiscated the possessions of (...) revolutionary organizations, and spread reactionary declarations. The crimes they committed are simply too numerous to mention. These clowns were none other than the "Capital Red Guards United Action Committee.". (shrink)

Conceptions of autonomy in western philosophy and ethics have often centred on self-governance and self-determination. However, a growing bulk of literature also questions such conceptions, including the understanding of the autonomous self as a self-governing independent individual that chooses, acts, and lives in accordance with her or his own values, norms, or sense of self. This article contributes to the critical interrogation of selfhood, autonomy, and autonomous decision making by combining a feminist focus on relational dimensions of selfhood and autonomy (...) with phenomenological philosophy of the embodied self as being-in-the-world. It offers a philosophical investigation of different dimensions of bodily relational autonomy by turning to phenomenological accounts of the lived body as self-reflexive. When so doing, we hope to contribute to bridging the gap that sometimes exists between discussions of autonomy in analytic moral philosophy and of freedom and facticity in phenomenological philosophy. We see this gap as unfortunate, and hold that a nuanced understanding of autonomy and autonomous decision making can be reached if these strands of philosophy are brought into dialogue. (shrink)

This collection of articles pays homage to the creativity and scientific rigor Jerome Singer has brought to the study of consciousness and play. It will interest personality, social, clinical and developmental psychologists alike.

ABSTRACTEmotional distractors can impair perception of subsequently presented targets, a phenomenon called emotion-induced blindness. Do emotional distractors lose their power to disrupt perception when appearing with increased frequency, perhaps due to desensitisation or enhanced recruitment of proactive control? Non-emotional tasks, such as the Stroop, have revealed that high frequency distractors or conflict lead to reduced interference, and distractor frequency appears to modulate attentional capture by emotional distractors in spatial attention tasks. But emotion-induced blindness is thought to reflect perceptual competition between (...) targets and emotional distractors, and it is unclear whether high frequency emotional stimuli cause less disruption at this relatively early stage of processing. In four experiments, participants searched streams of images for a rotated target image. A negative or neutral distractor appeared before the target, and their relative frequency was manipulated. Across all exper... (shrink)

What is the identity of the best regime in Aristotle's Politics? Although there are a few references to the best regime in Book III, the obvious answer is the regime discussed in Books VII and VIII. Aristotle calls it the best regime on numerous occasions and discusses it at great length. Yet, this is not the complete answer. In Book IV Aristotle makes certain curious remarks on the best regime that, on examination, do not fit the best regime of Books (...) VII and VIII. They lead, instead, to the discovery of a systematic, though quiet, teaching on a very different best regime in Book III. The Politics actually contains a complicated yet coherent teaching on two best regimes. Grasping this teaching is key to arriving at a proper understanding of the distinctive character of Aristotle's political thought. (shrink)

Jean Philiponus s'est toujours opposé à la notion nestorienne des anges servant les hommes à la place de Dieu. Jean Philiponus s'inscrit dans le courant égyptien critique de la fin du VIe siècle de certains récits apocryphes des anges dans l'univers primitif. L'argumentation de Philoponus est anti-dyophysite. Il s'attache à démontrer que l'univers que nous percevons est peuplé d'entités non corporelles puissantes, au service de Dieu et dont le rôle est de faire passer des messages aux êtres humains. Ces entités (...) ont été créées par le Dieu trinitaire avant l'acte divin de création. (shrink)

This article focuses on the most recent debates in the vibrant and emerging subfield of philosophy of emotion research. Given the dominance of 'cognitivist' theories of emotion in the philosophy, neurobiology, and cognitive science of emotion, we have witnessed a move away from attempts to pit reason and emotion against each other. This move, however, has opened the door to a host of thorny challenges for how we think about our affective relationship with the world, with concepts, and with other (...) minds. (shrink)

The struggle over legal abortion access in the United States is a religious controversy, not a scientific debate. Religious activists who believe that meaningful individual life (i.e., “personhood”) begins at a specific “moment-of-conception” are attempting to pass laws that force this view upon all pregnant persons, irrespective of their medical circumstances, individual preferences, or personal religious beliefs. This paper argues that such actions promote a constitutionally prohibited “establishment of religion.” Abortion policy in a secular state must be based upon scientifically (...) accurate biology, not unprovable theological presuppositions. The scientific facts regarding human pregnancy do not support the position that personhood begins with fertilization—at which point a pregnancy does not yet even exist. Abortion policy should regard the embryo/fetus as part of the pregnant individual’s body until delivery. We argue that individual “personhood” only begins when the _latent_ potentialities of the fetal nervous system are _actualized_ in the newborn after delivery. The paper argues that instantiating non-scientific beliefs concerning embryonic/fetal “personhood” into the law as the basis for abortion policy establishes a state-sponsored religion. The protection of religious liberty requires that abortion be decriminalized. Abortion should be treated like any other medical procedure and regulated similarly. To protect both religious freedom and sound medical practice, individual legal personhood should be recognized as beginning only at birth. (shrink)